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I.  INTRODUCTION 
“I’ll always be here for you.  I promise I’ll bring you home.”1  That was the 
promise made by Peggy Fugate to her little girl as the girl sat crying on her mother’s 
lap in a courtroom.2  Despite extensive effort on her part, Peggy was unable to make 
good on the promise that she made to her daughter.  Peggy fought her way through 
the legal system, never giving up on fulfilling her promise, but the Ohio Supreme 
Court shattered her dream of protecting her little girl.3  
In the courtroom that day, Selina McBride was taken from the custody of her 
mother,4 a decision which Peggy did not fight, “believing her daughter would be 
adopted into a clean, stable home . . . .”5 Unfortunately, little Selina, now sixteen, 
never found her way to a stable home.6  She has been shuffled among foster homes 
and finally landed in a group home.7  Life for Selina has been anything but stable.8 
Instability has led Selina down the wrong path in her young life.  At sixteen, she 
already has had trouble with the police.9 She has run away from her foster home 
                                                                
1Sharon Coolidge, Mom Wants to Adopt Daughter She Lost, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Oct. 
28, 2004, at 1A [hereinafter Coolidge, Daughter She Lost]. 
2Id. 
3See In re McBride, 850 N.E.2d 43 (Ohio 2006), rev’g 817 N.E.2d 459 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2004).  The Ohio Supreme Court held that Peggy was statutorily barred from moving for 
custody of her daughter after her parental rights had been terminated by the state.  Id. at 47. 
4Id. at 44. 
5Coolidge, Daughter She Lost, supra note 1. 
6In re McBride, 850 N.E.2d at 44. 
7Id. 
8See generally Sharon Coolidge, Remade Life Not Enough for Custody, CINCINNATI 
ENQUIRER, July 20, 2006, at 1A [hereinafter Coolidge, Remade Life]. 
9Id. 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol56/iss2/8
2008] A PLEA FOR PERMANENCE AFTER TERMINATION 421 
numerous times.10  The lack of a stable home life threatens to turn Selina into the 
type of person her mother once was—the very result the court intended to prevent by 
taking Selina from Peggy’s care. 
Nobody would argue that the Peggy Fugate who made that promise to her 
daughter deserved to retain custody of her child.  The old Peggy was a crack addict 
and had been “in and out of prison.”11  She had multiple children taken from her care 
because of neglect.12  But people can change,13 and that is exactly what Peggy did.14   
After nearly a decade of perseverance, Peggy turned her life around.15  Peggy is 
now in a happy and stable marriage; she works a full-time job and lives in an 
apartment with a spare bedroom.16  After straightening out her life, Peggy began to 
dream about reuniting with her daughter, knowing that she finally had the ability to 
be a good mother.17  The Juvenile Court has allowed Selina to visit with her mother, 
even allowing a few overnight visits, and Peggy has turned her spare bedroom into a 
room for Selina.18  Peggy has begun to develop and nurture a relationship with her 
daughter, a relationship of a nature that Selina has never experienced—a loving, 
parental presence.19 
The new Peggy discovered that her little girl was still bouncing around the foster 
care system and living in a group home;20 no mother wants that for her child.  So, 
Peggy entered the court system to seek custody of her child21 in a process that, she 
argued, should be analogous to adoption.22  “All I want to do is hug her and tell her 
how much I love her[,]”23 she said when initiating the proceeding.  Peggy met early 
success, with both the Juvenile Court and the Court of Appeals ruling that she was 
                                                                
10Id. 
11Coolidge, Remade Life, supra note 8. 
12Id. 
13In re McBride, 817 N.E.2d 459, 461 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004), rev’d, 850 N.E.2d 43 (Ohio 
2006) (“[O]ur court/justice/legal/moral system supposes that people can change.”).  The 
appellate court would have allowed Fugate the opportunity to have a best interests hearing in 
the trial court to determine if Selina should be returned to Fugate’s custody.  Id. at 462. 
14See generally Coolidge, Remade Life, supra note 8. 
15Id. 
16Coolidge, Daughter She Lost, supra note 1 (“Fugate . . . is now drug-free, married, and 
working full time . . . .”); Coolidge, Remade Life, supra note 8 (stating that Selina has a 
bedroom at Fugate’s apartment).   
17Coolidge, Remade Life, supra note 8. 
18Id. 
19See generally id. 
20In re McBride, 850 N.E.2d 43, 44 (Ohio 2006), rev’g 817 N.E.2d 459 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2004).   
21Id. 
22Coolidge, Remade Life, supra note 8. 
23Sharon Coolidge, After Seven Years, a Reunion, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Nov. 30, 2004, 
at 3B. 
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able at least to present an argument regarding her child’s best interests.24  Sadly, the 
Ohio Supreme Court delivered the news that Ohio law, as written, prevented Peggy 
from becoming a permanent part of her daughter’s life and rescuing her from the 
system that has failed her for so many years, without regard to what might be in 
Selina’s best interests.25 
The law relied upon by the Ohio Supreme Court mandates the outcome in this 
case.26  It does not, however, serve the purpose the State is supposed to serve in cases 
dealing with children.  The Ohio Revised Code is riddled with references to the “best 
interests of the child,”27 but the sections of the statutes relied upon by the Ohio 
Supreme Court in deciding McBride are oddly silent in that regard.28  Protecting 
children has always been of paramount importance in the courts as well,29 but the 
statute controls the outcome.30   
The statute must be amended to allow the courts to protect the best interest of the 
children for whom they are in place to serve, even if this means that occasionally a 
parent who was once adjudged to be incapable of caring for her child, and whose 
rights were subsequently terminated, may be the best, and often only, option to save 
that child from the dangers of the foster care system.   
                                                                
24In re McBride, 850 N.E.2d at 44. 
25See id. at 47. 
26See infra Part III. 
27See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1717.14, 2105.26, 2111.05, 2151.141, 2151.3521, 
2151.36, 2151.412, 3105.21, 3107.161, 5103.153, 5103.16 (LexisNexis 2007). 
28See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.414(F).  The subsection of the statute reads as follows: 
The parents of a child for whom the court has issued an order granting permanent 
custody pursuant to this section, upon the issuance of the order, cease to be parties 
to the action. This division is not intended to eliminate or restrict any right of the 
parents to appeal the granting of permanent custody of their child to a movant 
pursuant to this section. 
Id.  The Ohio Supreme Court interpreted this as a procedural fault in Peggy Fugate’s attempt 
to regain custody of her daughter.  In re McBride, 850 N.E.2d at 45-46.  See also OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 2151.353(E)(2) (LexisNexis 2007).  The text of this subsection reads as follows: 
Any public children services agency, any private child placing agency, the department 
of job and family services, or any party, other than any parent whose parental rights 
with respect to the child have been terminated pursuant to an order issued under 
division (A)(4) of this section, by filing a motion with the court, may at any time 
request the court to modify or terminate any order of disposition issued pursuant to 
division (A) of this section or section 2151.414 [2151.41.4] or 2151.415 [2151.41.5] 
of the Revised Code. The court shall hold a hearing upon the motion as if the hearing 
were the original dispositional hearing and shall give all parties to the action and the 
guardian ad litem notice of the hearing pursuant to the Juvenile Rules. If applicable, 
the court shall comply with section 2151.42 of the Revised Code. 
Id.  The Ohio Supreme Court read this provision as a bar to Peggy Fugate’s attempt to 
regain custody of her daughter.  In re McBride, 850 N.E.2d at 46-47. 
29See, e.g., In re Cunningham, 391 N.E.2d 1034, 1038 (Ohio 1979) (“[It is] the time-
honored precedent in this state that the ‘best interests’ of the child are the primary 
consideration in questions of possession or custody of children.”). 
30In re McBride, 850 N.E.2d at 47. 
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Part II of this Note will explore the dangers of exposure to the foster care system, 
illustrate why we need to protect children from prolonged exposure to the system, 
and highlight Ohio’s performance when it comes to permanency planning for 
children within the system.  Part III will explain the statutory framework on which 
this decision was based and shed more light on the problem created by this decision, 
as well as present a comparative analysis of how other jurisdictions handle this 
problem in their respective statutes.  Part IV will look to relevant case law for an 
understanding of the tradition in Ohio’s courts of protecting the “best interests” of 
children, as well as an analysis of the Ohio Supreme Court’s reasoning in McBride.  
In Part V, a solution to this problem will be proposed.  Finally, Part VI will 
conclude. 
II.  THE ILL EFFECTS OF EXPOSURE TO THE FOSTER CARE SYSTEM 
The effects of an extended stay in the foster care system can be devastating and 
long lasting.31  The story of Selina McBride is illustrative of many of these problems, 
problems resulting from the failures of the system; Selina is not alone in this 
regard.32  A plethora of studies have produced similar results regarding the negative 
impact that exposure to the foster care system has on the children it is supposedly in 
place to serve and protect, 33 some of which will be discussed below.  Also, as the 
foster care system becomes more dangerous the longer a child is exposed to it, 
discussion will follow regarding data that will help to understand how long children 
tend to stay in the foster care system and, more specifically, in the final section, how 
long Ohio children who have parental rights terminated are apt to stay in the system 
prior to finalization, as well as a comparison of how these numbers compare to the 
rest of the United States. 
A.  Real Examples of the Dangers Posed by Exposure to the Foster Care System 
An examination will show that the foster care system is far from the safehaven 
many believe it to be.  To the extent that it is intended to provide a safer home than 
that from which the affected children come, it probably is successful in the majority 
of cases.  However, if the goal is to provide a good, safe home for these children, 
then it has probably failed overall.  The story of Selina McBride highlights some of 
the shortcomings of the system, and there do exist many other stories that reinforce 
this view that the foster care system is not necessarily the place of refuge it is 
intended to be. 
                                                                
31See generally Deborah A. Martin-Grissom, Foster Care Adolescents: Examining 
Perceptions of a Model Resiliency and Life-Skills Training Program 30-45 (May, 2005) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cleveland State University) (on file with Cleveland State 
University Library) (setting forth a plethora of studies regarding the negative effects of the 
foster care system on children).  
32See, e.g., RICHARD ENGLAND, DISPLACED CHILDREN IN CRISIS—OUR ENABLING SYSTEM 
FOR HIGH RISK BEHAVIOR (2001).  Dr. England recounts the stories of multiple children in the 
foster care system, ranging from an infant to teenagers.  Id.  His stories shed light on the 
atrocities that unfortunately are commonplace in the foster care system, atrocities stemming 
from bureaucratic inefficiency to physical and emotional abuse and beyond.  Id.   
33See generally Martin-Grissom, supra note 31, at 30-45. 
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1.  The System Has Failed Selina 
Selina’s experience in the foster care system has been anything but ideal. 
Hamilton County Ohio Job and Family Services took custody of Selina at the age of 
seven with the intent of finding a permanent placement for her with an adoptive 
family.34  Peggy Fugate did not fight this outcome, because she believed that “her 
daughter would be adopted into a clean, stable home—one [she] was unable to 
provide.”35  Both Peggy and the agency were wrong.36  Selina has bounced through 
the system for seven years, finding temporary placement in a number of institutions 
and foster homes, never with any sign of permanence. 37 Selina has stated that she 
does not wish to go through the adoption process.38   At the time the Supreme Court 
denied Peggy the right to petition for custody of her daughter, Selina was living in a 
group home, from which she often ran away, and had been in trouble with the 
police.39   
Obviously, life has been hard on Selina.40  The system that she entered for 
protection has failed to protect her from the cruelties of the world.41  Something was 
not working right; the same something is wrong for too many of the children in the 
foster care system. 
2.  Selina Is Not Alone 
The foster care system lets countless children down each and every day.  The 
problems are certainly not specific to Ohio.  They plague the foster care systems of 
all of the states in this country and around the world.  What follows are some 
illustrative examples of how dangerous this system can be and why any opportunity 
to allow a child to break free should at least be considered in light of that child’s best 
interests. 
One such story is relayed in a book written by Dr. Richard England.42  Dr. 
England conveys the story of Dill, a ten-year-old boy who had the mind of a two-
year-old.43  The boy entered foster care as an infant and worked his way through the 
system, further and further from his biological relatives.44  All of the evidence 
indicated a history of sexual and physical abuse at a young age, rendering the boy 
                                                                
34See In re McBride, 850 N.E.2d at 44. 
35Coolidge, Daughter She Lost, supra note 1. 
36See generally Coolidge, Remade Life, supra note 8. 
37In re McBride, 817 N.E.2d 459, 460 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004), rev’d, 850 N.E.2d 43 (Ohio 
2006). 
38Id. 
39Coolidge, Remade Life, supra note 8. 
40See id. 
41See id.  
42ENGLAND, supra note 32. 
43Id. at 29.   
44Id. 
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essentially mute.45  Dill was acting out in school; he threw feces at any person who 
approached him and attacked the other children, which in turn led to Dill’s forced 
internment in a state psychiatric hospital.46  While in the hospital, Dill received 
twenty-four-hour care and extensive treatment, and the results were readily visible in 
his behavior.47  However, between the newfound smiles and communication, a new 
behavioral change occurred—attachment, only not to a family, but to “certain of the 
hospital state.”48  His behavioral progress led to placement with a foster family; 
within three weeks the boy was back in the hospital.49  Apparently, the state’s 
eagerness to place the child in the home had resulted in shoddy background checks 
and the boy was placed in the care of persons who had not been fully investigated.50  
The foster parents had stopped his medication and neglected him, possibly even 
physically abusing the boy.51  They found Dill walking naked down the street, 
muttering, crying and with no sense of where he was.52  
Dr. England provides another case study that is illustrative of many of the 
problems plauging the foster care system.  Cliff was sixteen and had been in over 
twenty foster care placements due to “severely disordered conduct.”53  Cliff had 
“poor impulse control, an extreme level of defiance, and . . . engaged in self-abusive 
behavior.”54  He came from a violent and dysfunctional family, having witnessed his 
father abusing his mother and hated them both for it.55  When approached by a 
psychologist, however, Cliff opened up to reveal an unexpected inner beauty, 
expressing his love for history, politics and current events as well as his impressive 
chess skills.56  Cliff asked to be released, but the psychologist spoke with the boy’s 
mother first.57  The mother revealed her fear that Cliff would follow through with the 
threats he had made on her life previously, and she knew that he was able to do so.58  
The psychologist did not recommend that Cliff be released, so he escaped from the 
                                                                
45Id. 
46Id. 
47Id. 
48Id. at 29-30. 
49Id. at 30. 
50Id. 
51Id. 
52Id. 
53Id. at 48.   
54Id. 
55Id. at 48-49. 
56Id.  
57Id. at 49. 
58Id. 
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prison that the state had made his home and moved in with his friends.59  The mother 
simply got a notice that he was at large.60 
The stories of Dill and Cliff are probably extreme examples, certainly more so 
than that of Selina McBride above, yet they are effective examples of how the 
system fails the children for whom it is in place to serve.  Dill spent his life looking 
for a permanent home to which he could attach himself.61  He did not find this home 
in an adoptive or foster family, but in a state mental hospital.62  Then, the state 
arranged for him to be taken from this place that he finally felt was home and to be 
placed into the home of people it had failed to investigate, people who caused 
irreparable damage to the poor boy.63  Dill needed special care due to his unique 
disabilities, and instead, he was given the first care that came along.64   
Cliff, on the other hand, represents a different failure of the system, a failure to 
help a child find closure from his old life and to begin anew in another.65  Cliff was 
caught up in the violence of his biological family and was unable to find happiness in 
any placement, even with his mother.66  The system must help to bring families 
together—even if those families are not biologically related.  
B.  Problems Commonly Occurring in Children in Foster Care 
Many studies have been conducted to determine the effects of the foster care 
system on the children for whom it is in place to protect.67  The results in the lives of 
Selina, Dill, and Cliff would probably come as little or no surprise to most of the 
researchers who have done these studies.  The dangers posed to children in the foster 
care system, the lack of proper medical care for children in the foster care system, 
                                                                
59Id. at 50. 
60Id.  
61Id. at 29-30. 
62Id. at 29. 
63Id. at 29-30. 
64Id. at 30. 
65See generally id. at 48-49. 
66Id. 
67See, e.g., Lily T. Alpert, Research Review: Parents' Service Experience—A Missing 
Element in Research on Foster Care Case Outcomes, 10 CHILD & FAM. SOC. WORK 361 
(2005); Bridgett A. Besinger et al., Caregiver Substance Abuse Among Maltreated Children 
Placed in Out-of-Home Care, 78 CHILD WELFARE 221 (1999); Bilha Davidson-Arad et al., 
Why Social Workers Do Not Implement Decisions to Remove Children at Risk from Home, 27 
CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 687 (2003); Laurel K. Leslie et al., Foster Care and Medicaid 
Managed Care, 82 CHILD WELFARE 367 (2003); Theresa McNichol & Constance Tash, 
Parental Substance Abuse and the Development of Children in Family Foster Care, 80 CHILD 
WELFARE 239 (2001); Donna D. Petras et al., Overcoming Hopelessness and Social Isolation: 
The ENGAGE Model for Working with Neglecting Families Toward Permanence, 81 CHILD 
WELFARE 225 (2002); Heather N. Taussig et al., Children Who Return Home from Foster 
Care: A 6-Year Prospective Study of Behavioral Health Outcomes in Adolescence, 108 
PEDIATRICS E10 (2001); Jenni Ward, Substance Use Among Young People 'Looked After' by 
Social Services, 5 DRUGS: EDUC., PREVENTION AND POL’Y 257 (1998).    
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and the short-term and long-term psychological effects of exposure to the foster care 
system are more than evident.68 
1.  The Dangers of the Foster Care System 
One author writes that there is no way of knowing how many children in the 
foster care system are abused and neglected and posits that the problem is more 
widespread than many believe it to be.69  Children in the foster care system “have 
been reported severely beaten and killed[,]” as well as being subjected to bizarre 
punishments, sexual abuse, and parental neglect.70  The author cites one national 
study which indicates that rates of abuse in the foster care system may be more than 
ten times the rates of abuse for children in the general population.71  Furthermore, the 
system fails to protect children by failing to report these abuses—one study showed 
that as much as 63% of cases of suspected abuse were not reported by one state 
agency.72  Further agency failure is evinced by reports that 43% of children were 
placed in “an unsuitable foster home,” and 57% of children in the system “were at 
serious risk of harm while in foster care.”73 
2.  The Lack of Good Medical Care for Children in the Foster Care System 
While all children are certainly in need of medical care, children in foster care 
have a greater need for medical care due to their generally lower health than any 
other group of children in the United States.74  Common problems found by 
researchers included children who had not received vaccinations and children who 
had not even received medical examinations upon entry into the foster care system; 
                                                                
68See, e.g., supra note 67. 
69Michael B. Mushlin, Unsafe Havens: The Case for Constitutional Protection of Foster 
Children from Abuse and Neglect, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REV. 199, 205 (1988).  As Deborah 
Martin-Grissom points out, physical abuse can be very dangerous: “Research also shows that 
being a victim of child abuse may result in antisocial behavior, depression, withdrawn 
behavior, and inappropriate sexual behavior.”  Martin-Grissom, supra note 31, at 31 (citation 
omitted). 
70Mushlin, supra note 69 at 205.  For a recent incident of foster care abuse in Ohio, see 
Mark Puente, Neighbor Testifies Against Gravelle, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Dec. 6, 2006, 
at B4.  This article tells some of the details of the story of the Gravelles, foster parents who 
were found guilty of a number of charges, including locking their foster children in what were 
essentially cages.  Id. 
71Mushlin, supra note 69, at 206.  Martin-Grissom notes that: “According to the American 
Academy of Pediatrics (2000), of the more than 500,000 children in foster care in the United 
States, most have been victims of repeated abuse and prolonged neglect and have not 
experienced a nurturing, stable environment during the early years of life.”  Martin-Grissom, 
supra note 31, at 39. 
72Mushlin, supra note 69, at 207. 
73Id. 
74Id. at 208.  Martin-Grissom agrees with this sentiment: “Children in foster care also are 
likely to suffer from a range of acute and chronic physical health problems.”  Martin-Grissom, 
supra note 31, at 42 (citation omitted). 
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those who did receive an examination often received an incomplete examination.75  
Masses of children in the foster care system are in need of vision and dental care—
but the system does not provide this for them.76  
3.  Short-Term Psychological Effects of Exposure to the Foster Care System 
The immediate psychological effects of exposure to the foster care system are 
devastating.  One study indicates that as many as 90% of children in the foster care 
system suffer from mental health problems warranting clinical intervention.77  
Specifically, high rates of attachment disorders plague children in foster care due to 
the inability of the children in the system to develop the necessary bonds with their 
caregivers when they are jumping from place to place.78  Another study reveals high 
rates of “involvement in juvenile crime and prostitution, mental and physical health 
problems, poor educational and employment outcomes, inadequate social support 
                                                                
75Mushlin, supra note 69, at 208.  Martin-Grissom found the following problems to be 
common among children in foster care: “upper respiratory infections, dermatologic disorders, 
dental caries, and malnutrition.”  Martin-Grissom, supra note 31, at 42 (citation omitted). 
76Mushlin, supra note 69, at 208-09; Martin-Grissom, supra note 31, at 42 (“[C]hildren in 
[foster] care, when compared to children not in care, were found to have higher rates of vision, 
hearing, growth, and dental problems.”) (citation omitted). 
77Susan Vig et al., Young Children in Foster Care: Multiple Vulnerabilities and Complex 
Service Needs, 18 INFANTS & YOUNG CHILD. 147, 151 (2005).  Martin-Grissom discusess the 
widespread nature of psychological problems in children in the foster care system: 
In a research study conducted by Clausen et al. (1996), behavior problems in the 
clinical and borderline range were observed in foster children at a rate of two and a 
half times that expected in a community population.  These researchers also noted that 
75 to 80 percent of foster children received scores either in the clinical or borderline 
range on one or both of the behavior problem and social competence domains.  In a 
similar study, McIntyre and Kessler (1998), report that 61% of the clinically 
disordered foster children in their sample manifested multi-symptom syndromes.  
. . . . 
. . . Research documents that overall, adolescents in foster care have been exposed to a 
multitude of adverse conditions and stressors, which may place them at risk for 
developing post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and substance abuse disorders. 
Martin-Grissom, supra note 31, at 31, 45 (emphasis added). 
78Vig et al., supra note 77, at 151.  Children affected by attachment disorders display the 
following characteristics: 
Children with insecure/ambivalent attachment are markedly distressed during 
separation and, upon reunion, are inconsolable, obsessed with the parent, and vacillate 
between the need for closeness and anger at the parent.  These children alternate 
between angry, clingy behavior and passive resistance to physical contact.  They can 
be recognized by their anxious behaviors, and are often diagnosed with Attention 
Deficit Disorder or Separation Anxiety.  Children with insecure/avoidant attachment 
show the most confusing, contradictory behaviors, marked by two conflicting drives: 
approach and avoidance.   
ENGLAND, supra note 32, at 45 (citing K. Reber, Children at Risk for Reactive Attachment 
Disorder: Assessment Diagnosis and Treatment, 5 PROGRESS: FAM. SYS. RES. & THERAPY 83).  
These conditions worsen with each subsequent placement and corresponding disturbance of 
the child’s sense of security.  Id.  By the time a child has worked through the system, there is a 
very good chance that they will develop one of these disorders.  Id.  
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systems and early parenthood” among children in the foster care system, linked to 
their fragile psyches and the psychological stress of being in the foster care system.79  
Yet, another study has indicated that the physical and mental problems of these 
children may further deteriorate during their stay in the foster care system.80  One 
study posited the following reasons for these problems: 
These poor outcomes reflect a number of factors including ongoing 
emotional trauma resulting from experiences of abuse and neglect prior to 
care, inadequate support while in care, accelerated transitions to adulthood 
and lack of guaranteed ongoing financial and other assistance to help 
facilitate this transition.  Young people leaving care do not currently 
receive the ongoing support that a good parent would be expected to 
provide for their children.81 
The foster care system obviously poses a danger to children while they are in it—a 
danger that should be avoided in favor of a safer outcome whenever available. 
4.  Long-Term Psychological Effects of Exposure to the Foster Care System 
The long-term effects on children exposed to the foster care system are just as 
devastating as the short-term effects.  A study of persons formerly in foster care, 
conducted in the United Kingdom, yielded disheartening results.82   The study found 
that adults who were in the system as children were less likely than their peers who 
had not been in the system to achieve high social status. 83  The study further found 
that these adults were much more likely than their peers to be homeless, to have at 
                                                                
79Philip Mendel & Badal Moslehuddin, From Dependence to Interdependence: Towards 
Better Outcomes for Young People Leaving State Care, 15 CHILD ABUSE REV. 110, 110 
(2006).  Martin-Grissom noted similar effects of the system upon children: 
Many researchers have noted the emotional and psychological outcomes related to 
foster care placement.  Dore and Eisner (1993), reported that adolescents in foster care 
frequently present with five dimensions of problematic psychosocial functioning, each 
of which reflect adverse early life experiences, (e.g., abuse, neglect, insecure early 
attachments, and inconsistent care giving).  The dimensions are: 1) inability to tolerate 
intimacy, 2) impulsivity, 3) fear of rejection, 4) aggression and 5) low self esteem. 
Martin-Grissom, supra note 31, at 32. 
80Martin-Grissom, supra note 31, at 43-44 (“While many children enter foster care with 
significant health, mental health and developmental problems, the foster care system itself 
may sometimes further exacerbate their problems.”); accord Russell M. Viner & Brent Taylor, 
Adult Health and Social Outcomes of Children Who Have Been in Public Care: Population-
Based Study, 115 PEDIATRICS 894 (2005), available at http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/ 
cgi/reprint/115/4/894.     
81Mendel & Moslehuddin, supra note 79, at 110. 
82See Viner & Taylor, supra note 80. 
83Id. at 896.  This could be due to a number of factors: 
[R]esearchers also reported children in foster care tend to have more difficulty with 
relating to others (Fashel & Shinn, 1978; Garland et al. 1996; Hulsey & White, 1989; 
Stein et al., 1996). Rest and Watson (1984) found that adults who had been in foster 
care as children tended to have difficulty with intimate relationships, a higher 
incidence of marital problems, and overall low self-esteem. 
Martin-Grissom, supra note 31, at 37. 
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least one criminal conviction, to suffer from psychological morbidity, and to have 
poor overall health.84  Furthermore, men with a history in the system showed higher 
rates of unemployment and histories of mental illness, while being less likely to 
succeed in higher education.85  Finally, women with a history in the system had high 
incidences of expulsion from school.86 
The foster care system can have brutal effects on the children it is in place to 
serve.  These effects last long beyond the children’s exit from the foster care system.  
The system is designed to protect them and give them a better life, but it fails too 
often in this regard. 
C.  National Foster Care Statistics  
Determining how long a child is likely to stay in the foster care system is a 
complex calculation.  A number of factors, including the race and age of the child, as 
well as the status of the child’s health, might come into play.87  However, a number 
of enlightening general figures are published by the Administration on Children, 
Youth and Families, a subpart of the United States Department of Health and Human 
Services’ Administration for Children and Families.88  An analysis of the data sheds 
some light on the overexposure to the foster care system, especially for older 
children.   
1.  The Age of Children in Foster Care 
The Administration for Children and Families provides large amounts of data for 
each fiscal year relative to trends and statistics in the foster care system nationwide 
and for each state.89  According to the preliminary numbers for fiscal year 2004, the 
                                                                
84Viner & Taylor, supra note 80, at 896.  Martin-Grissom also speaks to the societal strain 
caused by adults who are products of the foster care system: “In a study by Cook, Fleishman, 
and Grimes (1991), which explored employment and economic stability, the authors found 
that 40% of their former foster care participants were a ‘cost to the community’ at the time of 
the interview, (e.g., on welfare, in jail, or on Medicaid) . . . .” Martin-Grissom, supra note 31, 
at 39. 
85Viner & Taylor, supra note 80, at 896. 
86Id. 
87Infoplease: Adoption Trends, http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0881281.html (last 
visited April 8, 2008).  Approximately 8% of adoptions are transracial and it is extremely 
difficult to adopt a healthy white baby due to long waits.  Id.  Furthermore, children with 
disabilities have trouble finding a home even though they need it most.  Id.    
88See, e.g., UNITED STATES DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & 
FAMILIES, CHILD WELFARE OUTCOMES 2002: ANNUAL REPORT (2002). 
89See, e.g., UNITED STATES DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN 
& FAMILIES, THE AFCARS REPORT: PRELIMINARY FY 2004 ESTIMATES AS OF JUNE 2006 
(2006), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/stats_research/afcars/tar/report 
11.htm [hereinafter AFCARS 2004]; UNITED STATES DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., 
ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, TIME BETWEEN TPR AND FINALIZATION (2005), available 
at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/stats_research/afcars/statistics/time05.htm [hereinafter 
TIME BETWEEN TPR AND FINALIZATION]. 
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mean90 age of children in the foster care system in 2004 was 10.1, while the median91 
age was 10.9, with approximately 53% of children in the foster care system over the 
age of ten.92  The mean age of entry for children in the foster care system was 8.3 
years and the mean age of exit was 9.9 years.93  However, the average stay in the 
system was 30.0 months, rather than the 1.6 years that would seem apparent given 
the above numbers, with 18% of the stays lasting longer than three years.94  
Furthermore, roughly half of the children who exited the foster care system were 
under the age of ten, while roughly 37% of those exiting were between the ages of 
fifteen and eighteen.95  Approximately 27% of the children in the foster care system 
in 2004 had been in foster care for three or more years.96 
2.  Statistics Regarding Children Awaiting Adoption in the Foster Care System 
The Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting System Report 
(“AFCARS Report”) also includes information specific to those children in the foster 
care system awaiting adoption.97  The report indicates that approximately 65,000 
children in foster care had parental rights terminated for all living parents in fiscal 
year 2004 and that 118,000 children were awaiting adoption at the end of the fiscal 
year; the mean years that these children had been in continuous foster care was 43.8 
months. 98  Of these children who had been in continuous foster care, approximately 
13% had been in continuous foster care for less than one year, 42% for two to three 
years, and 45% for three or more years.99  On average, these children were five years 
old when they were removed from the care of their parents or other caretakers, but 
12% of these children were removed after the age of ten.100  Their average age was 
8.8 years, with 36% between the ages of zero and five years, 25% between the ages 
                                                                
90The mean of a group of numbers is essentially the average, found by adding all of the 
numbers, then dividing this total by the total number of things.  See, MCAS Math – Statistics 
and Probability: Mean, Median, Mode and Range, http://www.dean.tec.ma.us/MCAS/ 
mcasmean.htm (last visited April 8, 2008). 
91The median of a group of numbers is found by listing all of the numbers in order and 
finding the middle number, if you have an odd number of data, or averaging the middle two if 
you have an even number of data.  Id. 
92AFCARS 2004, supra note 89.   
93Id. 
94Id.  Ten percent of the children who exited foster care in 2004 had been in the system for 
three to four years, while 8% had been in the system for five years or more.  Id. 
95See id.  Also, note that of these, 8% are children who exited the system through 
emancipation, not because they found a permanent placement.  Id.   
96See id. 
97Id. 
98Id. 
99Id.  For fiscal year 2004, 53,479 children had been waiting for adoption for three or more 
years.  Id. 
100Id. 
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of six and ten years, and 34% over the age of ten.101  The average age of children 
adopted from the public foster care system was 6.9 years, with roughly 67% of 
children who were adopted out of the foster care system being under ten years of 
age.102 
Looking solely at national averages, it is apparent that there is a nationwide 
problem in the foster care system.  Far too many children are sitting in the system for 
far too long.  These children have precious little hope for a permanent home.  Once a 
child has been in the system more than three years or reaches the age of ten, or, even 
worse, both, his likelihood of adoption out of the system has been greatly 
diminished.  Another door, any opportunity to find a loving, permanent home, must 
be afforded to these children. 
D.  How Ohio Compares to the Rest of the Nation 
An analysis of relevant statistical data to see how Ohio’s foster care statistics 
compare to those of the rest of the United States can best be done by looking at a 
report generated by the Administration for Children and Families.103  This report 
gives data on the length of time between termination of parental rights and 
finalization for October 1, 2003 to September 30, 2004, comparing data from all fifty 
states as well as the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico.104  By looking to these 
figures, the potential for long-term exposure to the foster care system in Ohio, and 
elsewhere, can be readily identified. 
1. Percentage of Children Reaching Finalization within Twelve Months of Entry into 
Foster Care 
In Ohio, 46% of children who had parental rights terminated reached finalization 
within twelve months.105  While this figure may initially seem high, further analysis 
reveals that thirty-six states, as well as the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, had 
a higher percentage of children reach finalization in the first year,106 with Rhode 
Island, Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia leading the way with 85%, 84%, and 
82% of children achieving finalization within the first twelve months, respectively.107  
Two states tied Ohio in this respect, 108  and only eleven states109 had a lower 
                                                                
101Id.  Roughly 14,000 children fifteen years of age or older were awaiting adoption at the 
end of fiscal year 2004.  Id. 
102Id.   
103TIME BETWEEN TPR AND FINALIZATION, supra note 89. 
104Id. 
105See id. 
106See id.   
107Id. 
108Id.  Florida and Oregon each had forty-six percent finalization within the first year.  Id. 
109Alabama, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, South 
Dakota, Virginia, and West Virginia all had a lower percentage of children reach finalization 
within the first year.  Id.  West Virginia was the lowest, with only 24% reaching finalization 
within one year.  Id. 
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percentage of children reach finalization in less than one year.110  These data clearly 
indicate that children who enter Ohio’s foster care system subsequent to termination 
of parental rights are more likely to still be in the system in one year’s time than they 
would be if they had entered the system in another jurisdiction.   
2.  Percentage of Children Reaching Finalization after Three or More Years in Foster 
Care 
Ohio’s already tarnished success rate drops even further as a child sits longer in 
the system, making it among the worst states for children who do not reach 
finalization until three or more years have elapsed, with 13% of children falling into 
this category.111  Here, we find that forty-five states, the District of Columbia, and 
Puerto Rico now outperform Ohio by having a lower percentage of children reach 
finalization during this time frame, 112 with Utah and Wisconsin tying for the lowest 
percentage of children sitting in the system and waiting this long for finalization at 
2%.113  This means that only four states have a higher percentage of children not 
reach finalization until three or more years after termination of parental rights. 114  In 
other words, that unfortunate child who enters Ohio’s foster care system hoping to 
find a stable home is more likely than a child who enters in almost any other 
jurisdiction to sit in the system for at least three years before leaving the system—
and not all of those leaving are leaving to a permanent home. 
E.  The Federal Government’s Assessment of Ohio’s Foster Care System’s 
Performance 
In addition to publishing the statistical data for each state, the federal government 
also includes a section wherein it discusses how each state compares to the rest of the 
nation and to its past performance in a number of categories which it deems 
important.115  Of the seven categories considered by the federal government, five are 
important to consider in this Note.116  Of these five, two relate to the physical safety 
                                                                
110Id. 
111Id. 
112See id.   
113Id. 
114Maryland, Minnesota, New York, and Virginia all had a higher percentage of children 
wait until three or more years had elapsed prior to finalization.  Id.  Minnesota had the highest 
percentage at 16%.  Id.   
115See UNITED STATES DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & 
FAMILIES, CHILD WELFARE OUTCOMES 2003: OHIO, available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/ 
programs/cb/pubs/cwo03/state_data/ohio.htm.   
116This Note will not discuss Ohio’s performance in category four (“Reduce Time to 
Reunification Without [sic] Increasing Re-entry”) as this Note deals more specifically with 
cases where reunification with parents is not the ultimate goal.  Id.  Also, this Note will not 
discuss Ohio’s performance in category seven (“Reduce Placements of Young Children in 
Group Homes of Institutions”) as this does not directly speak to the problems discussed in this 
Note.  Id. 
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of children in Ohio’s foster care system, while the other three relate to foster care 
outcomes.117   
The two outcomes that relate to physical safety of children in foster care deal 
with reducing the incidence of abuse and neglect and reducing the recurrence of 
abuse and neglect for children in the foster care system.118  When it comes to 
reduction of the incidence of abuse and neglect, Ohio has both pros and cons—the 
incidence of abuse is slightly less than the national median,119 but this “represents a 
decline in performance from 2001 to 2003 . . . .”120  The figures look even more dim 
when looking at the recurrence rates, as it is initially noted that more children in 
Ohio who were “victims of maltreatment during the first 6 months of the year 
experienced another maltreatment incident within a 6-month period . . .” than the 
national median.121  Furthermore, the comments note that Ohio had a “relatively high 
child maltreatment victim rate.”122 
As to the program outcomes, Ohio again offers both good and bad results.  On a 
positive note, Ohio performed well on placement stability, which indicates that 
children in Ohio’s foster care system may be less likely to have multiple 
placements.123  Children awaiting adoption also tended to be more likely to reach 
adoption within a twenty-four month period in Ohio than the national median.124  
However, Ohio did not fare so well when it came to “[i]ncreas[ing] permanency for 
children in foster care . . . .”125  Less children exiting the foster care system in Ohio 
were leaving to a permanent home than the national median,126 and specifically, less 
                                                                
117Id.  Outcomes one and two relate to abuse and neglect of children in foster care, while 
outcomes three, five, and six relate to permanency, time in foster care, and placement stability, 
respectively.  Id. 
118Id. 
119Id.  In Ohio, “0.30 percent of the children in foster care were found to be maltreated by 
a foster parent or facility staff member . . . [while] the national median [was] 0.39 percent . . . 
.”  Id. 
120Id. 
121Id.  Ohio was at 8.4% recurrence, while the national median was 7.1%.  Id. 
122Id.  “In 2003, the child maltreatment victim rate in Ohio was 16.9 child victims per 
1,000 children in the State population . . . the national median [was] 10.6 child victims per 
1,000 children in the population.”  Id.  However, Ohio did improve over the period between 
2000 and 2003, as the rate was 18.8 per 1,000 in 2000.  Id.   
123Id. 
85.9 percent of the children in foster care in Ohio for less than twelve months 
experienced no more than two placement settings . . . which is slightly higher than the 
national median of 84.2 percent.  Also . . . 62.0 percent of the children in foster care 
for at least 12 months, but less than 24 months, experienced no more than two 
placement settings, which exceeds the national median of 59.1 percent.   
Id.  
124Id.   
125Id. 
126Id.  In Ohio, 83.1% of  children exited to a permanent home, while the national median 
was 86.3%.  Id. 
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children with disabilities who exited the system did so to a permanent home.127  
Finally, children who entered the system after the age of twelve were even less likely 
to leave to a permanent home.128 
F.  What Does This All Mean? 
Clearly, the above data show a number of things.  First of all, it demonstrates that 
exposure to the foster care system can have negative effects on a child, including 
developmental, emotional, physical, or mental effects.  It also shows that children 
who enter the system are apt to stay in the system.  The longer that a child has been 
in, or the later in his life that he enters the system, the less likely he is to leave the 
system into a permanent home.  The combination of these factors can lead to only 
one conclusion: the law ought to provide as many means as possible to allow 
children to escape from the system into a safe and permanent environment. 
III.  THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK: OHIO AND BEYOND 
A.  Ohio Statutes and Rules 
The Ohio Revised Code mandates protection of the best interests of children in a 
plethora situations.129  There are currently no less than fifty-nine provisions of the 
Ohio Revised Code that refer to the “best interest” of the child.130  These provisions 
span various subject areas, from corporations131 and labor and industry,132 which 
might not be as readily expected, to areas such as juvenile court proceedings133 and 
domestic relations.134  The Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure135 and the Ohio Rules of 
Juvenile Procedure136 also indicate the deference given to the best interests of the 
child.  Furthermore, the local rules of multiple Ohio’s Courts of Common Pleas 
make references to the best interest of the child.137  The theme is pervasive: the 
General Assembly, through enacting the various sections of the Code cited above, 
                                                                
127Id.  In Ohio, 76.4% of the disabled children who exited foster care went to a permanent 
home, while 79.5% was the national median for this same group.  Id. 
128Id.  In Ohio, 61.7% of children left to a permanent home, while the national median was 
72.2%.  Id. 
129See supra note 27 (listing some sections of the Ohio Revised Code that require the court 
to consider the best interests of the child). 
130Id. 
131See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1717.14 (LexisNexis 2007). 
132See, e.g., id.  § 4109.06. 
133See, e.g., id. tit. 21. 
134See, e.g., id. tit. 31.  
135See, e.g., OHIO R. CIV. P. 75.  
136See, e.g., OHIO JUV. R. 4, 6, 9, 13, 14, 29, 34, 38. 
137See, e.g., OHIO CUYAHOGA COUNTY DOM. REL. DIV LR 32; OHIO FRANKLIN COUNTY 
DOM. REL. DIV. LR 15, OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY DOM. REL. DIV. LR 2.1; OHIO 
MONTGOMERY COUNTY DOM. REL. DIV. LR 4.29; OHIO STARK COUNTY FAM. CT. DIV. LR 17; 
OHIO SUMMIT COUNTY DOM. REL. DIV. LR 26.  
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has shown its sincere desire to protect the best interest of the children who must be 
exposed to the legal system; the courts of this state are obligated to heed to their call 
and utilize the auspices of their offices to further this protectionist scheme in the best 
interests of the children that the courts are in place to serve.138 
1.  Termination of Parental Rights 
Ohio has procedures to be followed when the state believes that termination of 
parental rights is necessary.139  Termination of parental rights is generally a last 
resort effort and is used to free a child for adoption.140  For example, the state must 
make reasonable efforts to reunite the family prior to initiating a termination 
proceeding.141  However, if those reasonable efforts are unsuccessful, the state must 
proceed with termination proceedings.142 
There are a number of procedural safeguards in place to protect the rights of 
parents in a termination proceeding.  These safeguards include such things as notice 
to all necessary parties (which can be particularly difficult with unknown fathers) 
and appointment of counsel for parents whose rights are being reviewed by the 
court.143  While the court is to protect the rights and interests of the parents, the main 
purpose of the proceeding is to protect the best interests of the child or children 
involved.144   
To this end, there are different events that may lead to termination of parental 
rights in the state of Ohio.  As a precursor, the court must first find that it would be 
in the best interests of the child to have the parent’s rights terminated, and then the 
occurrence of any one of four situations will allow termination of the parent’s 
rights.145  First of all, if “the child cannot be placed with either of the child’s parents 
within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the child’s parents[,]” the court 
may enter an order terminating parental rights.146  Additionally, if the child has been 
                                                                
138Gishwiler v. Dodez, 4 Ohio St. 615, 617 (Ohio 1855) (“[T]he order of the court should 
be made with a single reference to [the child’s] best interests.”). 
139See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2151.414, 2151.353 (LexisNexis 2007); see also 
Cecilia Fiermonte & Jennifer L. Renne, Making it Permanent: Reasonable Efforts to Finalize 
Permanency Plans for Foster Children 27-31 (Claire Sandt ed., 2002) (discussing, generally, 
steps to aid in the termination of parental rights).  
140See FIERMONTE & RENNE, supra note 139, at 27 (“[T]erminat[ing] parental rights is the 
first step toward adoption.”).   
141See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.414 (LexisNexis 2007); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 
U.S. 745, 748 (1982) (“At the factfinding hearing, the State must establish, among other 
things, that for more than a year after the child entered state custody, the agency ‘made 
diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship.’”) (quoting N.Y. FAM. 
CT. ACT §§ 614.1(c), 611 (McKinney 2006)). 
142See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.414 (B)(2) (LexisNexis 2007). 
143See id. §§ 2151.353 (I)(1)-(4), 2151.414 (A)(1); FIERMONTE & RENNE, supra note 139, 
at 27-31. 
144See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2151.353, 2151.414 (A)(1) (LexisNexis 2007). 
145See id. § 2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(d); see also id. § 2151.353(A)(4). 
146Id. § 2151.414(B)(1)(a). 
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either abandoned or orphaned, with no relatives available to take permanent custody 
of the child, the court may intervene.147  Finally, if “[t]he child has been in the 
temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child 
placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month 
period . . .[,]” the court may terminate parental rights.148 
2.  Procedures Subsequent to Termination of Parental Rights 
In deciding McBride and holding that a parent whose parental rights have been 
terminated may not subsequently petition for custody of that child,149 the Ohio 
Supreme Court considered two Ohio Statutes.150  Ohio Revised Code Section 
2151.353 requires the court to consider “the best interest of the child” in a number of 
subsections,151 but subsection (E)(2), upon which the Court relied, does not direct the 
courts to determine what is in the best interest of the child.152  Section 2151.414 is in 
the same vein, containing several references to the best interest of the child,153 but the 
best interests of the child are not considered by the subsection relied upon by the 
Court.154  This Note will discuss the impact of Ohio Revised Code Section 2151.313 
                                                                
147Id. § 2151.414(B)(1)(b)-(c). 
148Id. § 2151.414(B)(1)(d). 
149In re McBride, 850 N.E.2d 43, 45 (Ohio 2006), rev’g 817 N.E.2d 459 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2004).   
150Id.  The two statutes considered were sections 2151.353(E)(2) and 2151.414(F). Id. 
151 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.353(A)(4), (C)(3) (LexisNexis 2007); see also 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.353(G)(1)(a)-(b) (LexisNexis 2007) (referring to the “child’s 
best interest”). 
152The text of the subsection is as follows: 
Any public children services agency, any private child placing agency, the department 
of job and family services, or any party, other than any parent whose parental rights 
with respect to the child have been terminated pursuant to an order issued under 
division (A) (4) of this section, by filing a motion with the court, may at any time 
request the court to modify or terminate any order of disposition issued pursuant to 
division (A) of this section or section 2151.414 or 2151.415 of the Revised Code. The 
court shall hold a hearing upon the motion as if the hearing were the original 
dispositional hearing and shall give all parties to the action and the guardian ad litem 
notice of the hearing pursuant to the Juvenile Rules. If applicable, the court shall 
comply with section 2151.42 of the Revised Code.  
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.353(E)(2) (LexisNexis 2007). 
153See, e.g., id. § 2151.414(A)(1), (B)(1)-(2). 
154The text of the subsection is as follows: 
The parents of a child for whom the court has issued an order granting permanent 
custody pursuant to this section, upon the issuance of the order, cease to be parties to 
the action. This division is not intended to eliminate or restrict any right of the parents 
to appeal the granting of permanent custody of their child to a movant pursuant to this 
section. 
Id. § 2151.414(F).  The lack of reference to the best interest of the child in this section is 
negligible in the analysis, however, since the quoted language is intended to apply at the time 
of termination of parental rights, whereas this Note is concerned with a time in the future.  The 
recommendation below will account for the necessity of allowing the terminated parent to 
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on the result in McBride and a recommendation of how to correct the statutory 
language to prevent future injustice.155 
While this statute, governing disposition of termination proceedings,156 certainly 
aims to protect the best interest of the child during the proceedings and at the time of 
the termination of parental rights, its treatment of the child’s best interests after the 
termination is insufficient.  Certainly in the vast majority of cases, a parent who has 
had her parental rights terminated is not likely to ever come to the point in her life 
where the child should be returned to her care. 157  But, what happens when a parent 
does change,158 and the child is still left in a system that has failed him for years?   
As the court in McBride noted, the disposition statute “specifically prohibits [the 
parent whose rights have been terminated] from requesting a modification or 
termination of permanent custody.”159  This result is undoubtedly mandated by the 
statutory language, but is it the proper result for this matter?  Justice Lanziger, 
writing for a unanimous court, left an indication that it might not be the ideal 
outcome, concluding his analysis by stating that the Court was simply “following the 
statutes as they are written.”160  The court is limited in duty to interpreting the 
statutes that the General Assembly promulgates and cannot of its own initiative 
promulgate its own statutory scheme.161 
                                                           
reenter the litigation as a named party through the proposed revisions to section 
2151.353(E)(2). 
155Ohio Revised Code Section 2151.353 is of little importance in this Note, as it deals with 
the question of who may be party to an action.  Its failure to protect the best interest of the 
child in a matter such as this can quite easily be corrected by adopting the recommended 
changes to the list of persons and entities who may petition for custody of a child after a 
termination of parental rights, which are proposed below.  Allowing the parent to enter into a 
new proceeding in a manner analogous to that of adoption would make this a moot point. 
Currently, Ohio law allows a party petitioning for adoption to file a petition “styled, ‘in the 
matter of adoption of [name of child],’” thus, creating a new action, rather than filing under 
the older action wherein the parental rights had been terminated, as Peggy Fugate had done.  
Id. § 3107.04. 
156See id. § 2151.353.  
157Parental rights may be terminated for a number of reasons, including, inter alia, abuse, 
neglect, and incarceration, and failure to follow a case plan developed by the local children’s 
service agency. Id. § 2151.414. 
158Recall the Ohio Appellate judge’s assertion that “our court/justice/legal/moral system 
supposes that people can change.” In re McBride, 817 N.E.2d 459, 461 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004), 
rev’d, 850 N.E.2d 43 (Ohio 2006). 
159In re McBride, 850 N.E.2d 43, 46 (Ohio 2006), rev’g 817 N.E.2d 459 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2004).   
160Id. at 47. 
161Id. 
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3.  The Best Interests of the Child 
Several provisions of the Ohio Revised Code provide factors to be considered 
when making a “best interest” determination.162  For example, section 2151.414(D) 
lists factors for the court to consider when determining if termination of parental 
rights is in the best interest of the child: 
(1) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child’s 
parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-home providers, 
and any other person who may significantly affect the child; 
(2) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through 
the child's guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the child; 
(3) The custodial history of the child, including whether the child has been 
in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies 
or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a 
consecutive twenty-two month period . . .; 
(4) The child’s need for a legally secure permanent placement and 
whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of 
permanent custody to the agency; 
(5) Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this section 
apply in relation to the parents and child. 
These types of factors can very easily be adapted to apply in the opposite 
analysis—as factors to consider whether reinstatement of parental rights 
would be in the best interest of the child. 
B.  Is Ohio Alone in Its Treatment of Parents Whose Rights Have Been Terminated? 
All states have statutory mechanisms in place for termination of parental rights 
and the procedures to be followed by the courts subsequent to termination of parental 
rights.  However, the rules governing these proceedings vary greatly. These types of 
statutes and rules generally fall into one of three categories: those that do not allow a 
parent to regain parental rights subsequent to termination, those that are silent or 
unclear on the question, 163 and those that do allow a parent to regain parental rights 
                                                                
162See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.414 (LexisNexis 2007) (setting forth a list of 
factors to be considered when determining whether termination of parental rights is in the best 
interests of the child or children involved); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04 (LexisNexis 
2007) (setting forth a list of factors to be considered when determining whether shared 
parenting is in the best interests of the child or children involved); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
3109.051(LexisNexis 2007) (setting forth a list of factors to be considered when determining 
whether an order granting parenting time or companionship time, or visitation rights are in the 
best interests of the child or children involved). 
163These states will not be discussed in this Note, as their individual ambiguity lends no 
clue as to the efficacy of statutes for and against reinstatement of parental rights.  Included in 
the states that do not speak of the issue or are too ambiguous to be interpreted as speaking to 
the issue are Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
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subsequent to termination.  Statutes denying parents any future opportunity for 
reinstatement of parental rights and those granting the opportunity for reinstatement 
will be considered in turn. 
1.  Statutes Denying a Parent the Opportunity to Have Parental Rights Reinstated 
There are a number of mechanisms used to bar a parent from regaining parental 
rights once those rights have been severed.  No fewer than ten jurisdictions 164 utilize 
a clause denying the parent whose rights have been terminated “any right to object to 
the adoption or otherwise participate in the adoption proceedings”165 as an initial 
mechanism to deny a parent from re-entering the child’s life.166  Other states impose 
a time limit for all challenges to orders terminating parental rights.167  At least one 
state appears to deny a parent whose rights have been terminated any option to 
challenge the ruling at all, aside from appellate review.168  One state denies courts the 
power to set aside an order terminating parental rights.169  Oregon appears to have 
one of the strictest statutes, which acts to strip the parent of standing for any type of 
future proceeding regarding the child for whom the parent has been stripped of 
parental rights by the court.170 
                                                           
Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, South 
Dakota, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin. 
164Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-606 (2007)), District of Columbia (D.C. CODE 
ANN. § 16-2361 (LexisNexis 2007)), Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-93 (2007)), Maine 
(ME REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4056 (2007)), Montana (MONT. CODE ANN. § 42-2-611 
(2007)), New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-29 (LexisNexis 2007)), North Carolina 
(N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1112 (2007)), North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-46 (2007)), 
Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-413 (2007)), and Wyoming (WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-317 
(2007)).  
165WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-317(b) (2007). 
166Remember that the process sought by Ms. Fugate’s attorney, which is practically 
synonomous with the recommendation contained herein, argues for a proceeding similar to an 
adoption proceeding.  Statutes such as this could be argued as a bar to proceedings in this 
nature.   
167See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1108 (2007) (six months); N.D. CENT CODE § 27-
20-45 (2007) (30 days); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7505-7.2 (West 2007) (three months); 
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-21.1 (2007) (180 days); TEXAS FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.211 (Vernon 
2007) (one year).  
168ME REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4038 (2007). 
169NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 128.120 (LexisNexis 2007); but see § 128.160 (allowing a 
parent whose rights have been terminated to petition the court to set aside a subsequent 
adoption of that child). 
170OR. REV. STAT. § 419B.524 (2007). 
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2.  Statutes Permitting a Parent to Have Parental Rights Reinstated171 
A select few jurisdictions allow a parent a method by which they may be able to 
have parental rights reinstated.  Each of these states has a slightly different approach 
to the subject, although all have similar practical effects.  These statutes are in some 
ways analogous to the recommendations presented below, although none achieve 
these results in the same way, nor as effectively.172 
The first state to be considered is Tennessee.173  This is the most difficult of the 
states to evaluate regarding a parent’s ability to have parental rights reinstated 
subsequent to termination.  To get to that point, two statutes must be considered.  
First, remembering the analogy between reinstatement and adoption, the Tennessee 
legislature has enacted a statute that provides that any party may file a petition for 
adoption.174  Taken alone, this is hardly grounds for celebration.  However, another 
Tennessee statute makes it illegal for a person whose parental rights have been 
terminated to obtain custody of the child “otherwise than by legal process.”175  Read 
together, these statutes indicate that a parent whose parental rights have been 
terminated has a legal procedure available to her, in the state of Tennessee, to have 
her rights reinstated as to that child.  However, this difficult use of two sections is a 
weak point for a parent who truly desires to pursue this type of proceeding.  While 
Tennessee has taken some vague steps in the right direction, it has not quite solved 
the problem. 
The next instance of a state allowing a parent to regain parental rights subsequent 
to termination presents an innovative approach to the problem, with a rule mirrored 
by no other state.  The California legislature enacted a statute containing the 
following provision: 
A child who has not been adopted after the passage of at least three years 
from the date the court terminated parental rights and for whom the court 
has determined that adoption is no longer the permanent plan may petition 
the juvenile court to reinstate parental rights pursuant to the procedure 
prescribed by Section 388.176 
Accordingly, a child may petition for reinstatement of the parent’s rights in the 
state of California, while the parent himself may not do so.  Such a petition will be 
considered in light of numerous statutory factors, including the likelihood of 
adoption of the child and the need for permanency, related to the best interests of the 
                                                                
171Most states do allow a state agency to petition for rights on behalf of a parent whose 
rights have been terminated, however, such an occurrence is so unlikely to be pursued by the 
state agency as to render it essentially a moot point. 
172This is true both because the recommendation is tailored specifically to the needs 
arising under Ohio law and because the solution proposed herein is a more comprehensive 
solution rather than a general statutory framework. 
173We will consider two Tennessee statutes, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 36-1-115 and 36-1-123 
(2007).   
174Id. § 36-1-115. 
175Id. § 36-1-123. 
176CAL. FAM. CODE § 366.26(i)(2) (West 2007). 
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child.177  Again, the legislature has taken a step in the right direction, but has failed to 
reach a place that will truly protect the best interests of the child.  This solution 
necessarily requires the child to have to choose, prior to any inquiry into the best 
interests of that child, that he would like to return to the care of a parent.  However, 
if the proceeding does not turn out in the child’s favor, the damage done to his 
already fragile emotional state, caused by additional exposure to the court system, is 
certainly not in that child’s best interests. 
The legislature of Nevada has provided yet another interesting twist.  As noted 
above, Nevada law does not allow a court to set aside an order terminating parental 
rights.178  However, the legislature does provide a mechanism whereby a parent who 
has had their rights terminated may petition to have the court order terminating 
parental rights set aside after a decree of adoption has been issued awarding custody 
of the child to another party.179  At a hearing on a petition of this nature, the court is 
compelled to look into whether returning the child to the biological parent would be 
in the child’s best interests.180  This statute, however, fails to truly promise 
permanency, as it allows the parent to interfere after the child has finally found 
placement in a permanent home.  A proceeding of this nature could have devastating 
effects on the child’s mental and emotional health.  
The North Dakota legislature shows both the recognition of the dangers of long-
term exposure and understanding of the importance of permanency for the child, but 
has implemented procedural safeguards to protect the child.181  Under this statute, the 
“order terminating parental rights . . . may be vacated by the court upon motion of 
the parent if the child is not on placement for adoption and the person having 
custody of the child consents . . . .”182  These safeguards, while enacted with good 
intentions, probably are not the most effective means of protecting the child’s best 
interests.  Under this statutory approach, if the child is up for adoption, even if the 
chances for adoption are slim, the parent cannot intervene to save the child from the 
system.183  Furthermore, the person having custody of the child, whose consent is 
necessary for the parent to regain parental rights, may be biased against the parent, 
since the custodian likely received custody of the child in the proceeding that 
terminated the parent’s rights.184 
The West Virginia legislature has demonstrated compassion for the best interests 
of the children of its state by enacting a statute that allows for a parent to make a 
motion to modify an order terminating parental rights.185  This statute requires the 
                                                                
177Id. 
178See supra note 169. 
179See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 128.160 (LexisNexis 2007). 
180Id.  The statute mandates a presumption that “remaining in the home of the adopting 
parent is in the child’s best interest.”  Id.  
181N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-37 (2007). 
182Id. (emphasis added). 
183Id.   
184Id. 
185W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-6-6 (LexisNexis 2007).  This section also allows the state 
agency to make the petition.  Id. 
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moving party to demonstrate a change of circumstances warranting modification of 
the previous order.186  The only apparent limitation upon this protection is that the 
order “shall not be modified after the child has been adopted.”187  With this caveat, 
the legislature has shown its understanding of the importance of permanency in a 
child’s home life, however, it has not taken the comprehensive approach truly 
necessary to correct this problem. 
Finally, the statutory framework adopted by the Hawaii legislature appears to be 
among the most in tune with the child’s best interest.  The Hawaiian approach to the 
problem at hand is sensitive to the needs of children in the system.188 The statute, in 
relevant part, contains the following provision: 
[A]t any time following the expiration of one year from the date of the 
entry of any such judgment of termination of parental rights, upon the 
motion of the parent or parents of the child or the department of human 
services or any child-placing organization approved by the department or 
any other proper person, based upon the fact that the child has not been 
adopted or placed in a prospective adoptive home, the court in which the 
judgment was entered shall review the same and shall consider the 
currently reported circumstances of the child and of the parent or parents 
and shall enter its findings as to whether the circumstances, and the 
present best interests of the child, justify the continuance of the 
judgment.189 
This section grants the court the discretion to consider a number of best interests 
factors, some of which are mandated in the statute itself, in determining if reuniting 
the child with the parent is appropriate if the child has sat in the foster care system 
for only a single year.190  Clearly, the Hawaiian legislature was aware of the dangers 
of long-term exposure to the foster care system and was willing to recognize the 
necessity of providing safeguards for the children of that state who must be exposed 
to the foster care system.  
IV.  CASE LAW 
The courts of Ohio have been called upon countless times to make 
determinations regarding children and, in many of those instances, the best of 
interests of children.  The best interests of a child were first considered by the Ohio 
Supreme Court over 120 years ago.191  Since that time, the Ohio Supreme Court has 
shaped and defined the phrase through a multitude of judicial opinions.  While the 
                                                                
186Id. 
187Id. 
188HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 571-63 (LexisNexis 2007). 
189Id.  
190Id. 
191Gishwiler v. Dodez, 4 Ohio St. 615, 617 (Ohio 1885) (“[T]he order of the court should 
be made with a single reference to [the child’s] best interests.”).  The case involved a custody 
dispute, which the court resolved in favor of the mother of the child, over the father’s assertion 
that he had the sovereign authority over his child.  Id. Gishwiler is still cited for the 
proposition that the best interests of the child should be paramount under Ohio law.  
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composition of the Court has fluctuated, deference for the best interests of a child has 
remained the same from 1885192 up through today.193  
The application of the best interests concept has been seen in a number of 
contexts, spanning from determination of parental rights and responsibilities amongst 
parties to a divorce,194 to whether a child’s relatives should have visitation rights with 
the child,195 and even to determination of whether a child’s surname should be 
changed.196  Of particular significance to the issue at hand, the best interests of the 
child are held by the Ohio Supreme Court to be of the utmost importance in 
determining whether termination of parental rights is appropriate under the 
circumstances.197  One Ohio Supreme Court Justice has even gone so far as to write 
that “[t]he ultimate responsibility is on the judge to proceed in the best interests of 
the children.”198  Clearly, the Ohio Supreme Court considers children’s best interests 
to be a crucial inquiry. 
When faced with the case of Selina McBride, however, the Ohio Supreme Court 
did not consider her best interests.  Selina came before the Ohio Supreme Court at 
the culmination of a long, sad story, beginning in a courtroom where her mother’s 
parental rights were terminated and finding its way back into the courts when her 
mother tried to save her from a life of perpetual confinement to a system that had 
                                                                
192See, e.g., id. 
193See, e.g., Children’s Home of Marion County v. Fetter, 106 N.E. 761, 766 (Ohio 1914) 
(“The presumption is that the juvenile court of Marion county, when it committed Howard 
Fetter to the Children's Home, was acting with reference to the best interests and welfare of 
the child.”); Trickey v. Trickey, 106 N.E.2d 772, 774 (Ohio 1952) (“[The trial judge] 
evidenced sincere concern for the welfare and best interests of the child and acted only after 
deliberation.”); In re Cunningham, 391 N.E.2d 1034, 1038 (Ohio 1979) (“Such an 
interpretation of the statute is consistent with the time-honored precedent in this state that the 
‘best interests’ of the child are the primary consideration in questions of possession or custody 
of children.”); In re Schaefer, 857 N.E.2d 532, 538 (Ohio 2006) (“A court must conclude by 
clear and convincing evidence that an assignment of permanent custody is in the best interest 
of the child.”). 
194See, e.g., Kelm v. Kelm, 749 N.E.2d 299, 303 (Ohio 2001) (“With respect to matters of 
custody and visitation, the central focus is not, as appellant suggests, the rights of the parents 
but is, rather, the best interests of the children.”). 
195See, e.g., Harrold v. Collier, 836 N.E.2d 1165, 1172 (Ohio 2005) (“The court ultimately 
decided that Brittany's best interests in maintaining her relationship with [her grandparents] 
outweighed [her parent’s] desire for no visitation.”). 
196See, e.g., In re Willhite, 706 N.E.2d 778, 782 (Ohio 1999) (“We hold that when 
deciding whether to permit a name change for a minor child pursuant to R.C. 2717.01(A), the 
trial court must consider the best interest of the child in determining whether reasonable and 
proper cause has been established.”). 
197See, e.g., In re C.W., 818 N.E.2d 1176, 1178 (Ohio 2004) (“[B]efore a court can grant 
permanent custody to the moving agency, it must ‘determine[e] . . . , by clear and convincing 
evidence, that it is in the best interest of the child to grant permanent custody of the child to 
the agency that filed the motion for permanent custody . . . .’”) (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 2151.414(B)(1) (LexisNexis 2007)). 
198Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Karto, 760 N.E.2d 412, 420 (Ohio 2002) (Pfeifer, J., 
dissenting). 
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failed her on so many occasions.199  Little Selina had spent most of her life in the 
system, a system that her mother had believed was the safest option for the child.200  
However, time passed and the system failed to achieve a permanent placement for 
Selina, but instead placed her in a group home.201  She ran away frequently and had 
trouble with the law on occasion.202  Her mother wanted to save her from this 
negative lifestyle, so she petitioned the Juvenile Court for custody of her daughter.203  
Selina’s safety and interests apparently were at the forefront of the Juvenile Court’s 
analysis, as it ruled that Peggy should at least be allowed the opportunity to present 
her argument as to why granting custody of Selina to Peggy would be in the child’s 
best interests.204 
The appellate court agreed with the decision of the juvenile court, which had 
decided the case under its mistaken belief that there was no statute or precedent to 
guide in the decision.205  The appellate court remembered the importance of the best 
interests of the child in the judicial scheme, stating that, “[i]n hearing her petition, 
the court will focus primarily on the events of the past seven years, and, most 
importantly, on what will now be in Selina's best interests.”206 The appellate court 
would have allowed Fugate the opportunity to at least present evidence that a life 
with her was in Selina’s best interest.207  Up until this point in the case, the judicial 
system had acted in a manner consistent with its tradition of protecting, above all 
else, the best interests of the children for whom it was in place to serve. 
The Ohio Supreme Court’s opinion in McBride lacks that magic little phrase. 208  
The Ohio Supreme Court held that Fugate was not allowed even the opportunity to 
attempt to convince the Juvenile Court that Selina’s best interests should be 
considered, regardless of the party asking it to do so.209  Why the discrepancy?  The 
Ohio Supreme Court’s opinion rests on an application of two sections of the Ohio 
Revised Code.210  These sections of the Ohio Revised Code govern disposition of 
                                                                
199See generally In re McBride, 850 N.E.2d 43 (Ohio 2006), rev’g, 817 N.E.2d 459 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 2004); see also Coolidge, Daughter She Lost, supra note 1. 
200See Coolidge, Remade Life, supra note 8. 
201Id.  
202Id. 
203In re McBride, 817 N.E.2d 459, 461 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004), rev’d, 850 N.E.2d 43 (Ohio 
2006). 
204Id.  
205Id.  
206Id. (emphasis added). 
207Id. at 462. 
208In re McBride, 850 N.E.2d 43 (Ohio 2006), rev’g, 817 N.E.2d 459 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2004).  The court barred Peggy from petitioning for custody of her daughter based on an 
analysis of two statutes, neither of which required, or even suggested, that the court consider 
the best interests of the child.  Id. 
209Id. at 47. 
210Id. at Syllabus.  For a full discussion of the statutory scheme, see supra Part III. 
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abused, neglected, or dependent children211 and procedures upon motion for 
permanent custody of a child.212  The first section is cited by the Ohio Supreme Court 
as barring Fugate’s attempt to petition for custody of her daughter because she is not 
on the statutory list of persons and entities who may make such a petition.213  The 
second section is cited for the proposition that Fugate was a non-party to the action, 
and therefore, lacked standing to file the petition in the Juvenile Court under the 
original case number.214  On the basis of these two statutes, the Court “h[e]ld that a 
parent who has lost permanent custody of a child does not have standing as a 
nonparent to file a petition for custody of that child.”215 
Where, though, did the best interests fall to the wayside?  The Ohio Supreme 
Court had a tremendous track record, spanning over 120 years, of protecting the best 
interests of children who unfortunately had found their way into the court system.216  
Yet, when it came time to decide McBride, the Ohio Supreme Court was silent on the 
best interests of Selina.217  Never once did the Court say in the opinion that the 
outcome would protect the best interests of Selina or that the statute was designed to 
protect the best interests of Selina.218  This is because the Court is in place to 
interpret the laws as given to them.219  The above discussion of the statutory language 
shows that, indeed, the Ohio Supreme Court was bound by the language of the 
statutes involved, and the outcome, while tragic, was probably right.220  This is not a 
problem that should be corrected by the courts; this problem can only be corrected 
by the Ohio General Assembly through statutory reform. 
                                                                
211OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.353 (LexisNexis 2007). 
212Id. § 2151.414.  
213In re McBride, 850 N.E.2d at 46 (applying OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.353(E)(2) 
(LexisNexis 2007)).  The statute lists multiple entities and any person who has not had 
parental rights terminated as parties who may petition for custody after a termination of 
parental rights has occurred.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.353(E)(2) (LexisNexis 2007). 
214In re McBride, 850 N.E.2d at 45 (applying OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.414(F) 
(LexisNexis 2007)).  The statute removes a parent whose rights have been terminated as a 
party to the action, thus, that parent cannot make a motion under the original case number. 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.414(F) (LexisNexis 2007). 
215In re McBride, 850 N.E.2d at 47. 
216See supra notes 191 & 194. 
217In re McBride, 850 N.E.2d at 47. 
218Id. 
219Id. at 47. 
220See supra Part III. 
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V.  THE SOLUTION221 
The statutory structure that exists in Ohio at this time fails to fully protect 
children from the dangers inherent in the foster care system.222  The courts cannot 
protect the children because they are bound to follow the statutes as written. 
Therefore, one must look to the Ohio General Assembly for relief from this problem.  
Statutory reform can be implemented in such a way that it protects the best interest 
of children by carefully considering every opportunity to find a permanent placement 
for the child, regardless of the identity of the person moving for custody.  By 
allowing children the greatest number of options, while still considering what is in 
the best interest of these children, it is possible to save children from over exposure 
to the foster care system.223 
The first step that the legislature needs to take is to eliminate the phrase “other 
than any parent whose parental rights with respect to the child have been terminated 
pursuant to an order issued under division (A)(4) of this section” from Ohio Revised 
Code § 2151.353(E)(2).224 The statute, thus rewritten, would allow a parent who has 
turned her life around to at least have her interest in regaining custody of her child 
considered by the court in light of the child’s best interests, rather than barring her 
attempt simply because she once lost essentially the same rights that she is now 
asking the court to grant to her.  However, there need to be restraints in place in 
order to effectively allow only rehabilitated parents to ask the court to consider their 
suitability as a parent to the child over which they no longer retain parental rights.225  
There should be a number of conditions precedent to a parent’s filing of a petition for 
custody, or adoption, of the child which must all be met prior to initiation of any 
                                                                
221While this solution is aimed specifically at redressing the Ohio Revised Code’s 
shortcomings relative to the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in McBride, these principles and 
examples could easily be applied in a multitude of other jurisdictions, as discussed in Part III 
of this Note. 
222See generally supra Parts II & III. 
223In theory, even if only one child is saved from the dangers of the system, this system 
has been successful.   
224OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.353(E)(2) (LexisNexis 2007).  The revised subsection in 
full would then read as follows: 
Any public children services agency, any private child placing agency, the department 
of job and family services, or any party, by filing a motion with the court, may at any 
time request the court to modify or terminate any order of disposition issued pursuant 
to division (A) of this section or section 2151.414 or 2151.415 of the Revised Code. 
The court shall hold a hearing upon the motion as if the hearing were the original 
dispositional hearing and shall give all parties to the action and the guardian ad litem 
notice of the hearing pursuant to the Juvenile Rules.  If applicable, the court shall 
comply with section 2151.42 of the Revised Code.   
Id. (with language omitted to reflect the proposed changes).  
225While some might argue that a best interests hearing would effectively eliminate the 
need for the proposed restraints, the author believes that these are a more effective tool to 
prevent a parent from beginning proceedings that will be unsuccessful and, thus, having an 
emotional and psychological effect on the child that may create lasting damage.  Furthermore, 
these can reduce the potential strain on the judicial system by limiting the number of full best 
interest hearings. 
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proceedings, as well as certain guidelines that the court must keep in mind when 
ruling on these sensitive matters. 
First, there must be no other person or entity in the process of adopting the child.  
This provision ensures that the child avoids being put in the ominous position of 
having to choose between a parent and some other person or entity, which would be 
strenuous on the child’s already burdened psyche, while promoting stability.  
Furthermore, the reason that this reform is necessary is to avoid long-term exposure 
to the foster care system for these children; if another person is moving to adopt that 
child, it is less likely that the child will be in the system for an extended period of 
time.  Immediately upon dismissal or termination of the other party or entity’s action, 
the parent would be able to make her motion. 
Additionally, there should be a statutory minimum number of years that the child 
must have been continuously in the foster care system without finding a permanent 
home before a parent may file her petition for custody. This provision would help to 
ensure that children at the highest risk for the dangers of the foster care system, due 
to long-term exposure, would be able to find a home with a parent who has had time 
to correct the problems in her life.  The author recommends a minimum of three 
years.226 
On top of that, there must be a statutory minimum period that the parent can 
prove that she has turned her life around and corrected the problems that led to the 
termination of her parental rights. This additional provision helps to ensure that the 
parent has shown a sincere dedication to correcting her life and has not simply 
cleaned up for a short-term period once the child has been in the system for the 
minimum number of years.  The author recommends a minimum of eighteen months 
for this requirement.  The parent should be required to set forth facts and evidence to 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that this requirement is met.  Evidence to 
this effect could include, inter alia, proof of steady employment and income, 
completion of treatment for drug or alcohol abuse, steady habitation of a place of 
residence, or an ongoing commitment to other members of the parents’ family such 
as a spouse or significant other, the parents’ other children, or the children of a 
spouse or significant other.227 
If all of these conditions are fulfilled, the court should move on to an analysis of 
whether returning to the parent’s care would be in the child’s best interest.  At this 
stage, one final limitation must be recognized: the parent should receive no deference 
simply due to her status as biological parent of the child.  The court could then 
proceed to a best interest determination using factors such as those found in Ohio 
Revised Code Section 2151.414(D).228   
                                                                
226See supra Part III.E.1, stating that thirteen percent of Ohio’s children do not reach 
finalization until after they have been in the foster care system three or more years. 
227This is in no manner intended to be an exhaustive list, but rather a few indicative factors 
that the author finds relevant. 
228OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.414(D) (LexisNexis 2007).  This statute provides the 
following factors to be considered when evaluating the best interests of the child when 
determining whether termination of parental rights is appropriate: 
(1) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child's parents, siblings, 
relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-home providers, and any other person who may 
significantly affect the child; 
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This language could be easily inserted into the statute as subsection (E)(3), which 
could be written as follows: 
(3)(a) With respect to division (E)(2), if the party moving for custody is a 
parent whose parental rights with respect to the child have been 
terminated pursuant to an order issued under division (A)(4) of this 
section, the following conditions must be met before the court may 
proceed with the motion: 
(i) No other person or entity may be in the process of seeking custody of 
the child; 
(ii) The child must have been in state custody for at a minimum of three 
consecutive years; and 
(iii) The parent must show by a preponderance of the evidence that he has 
corrected the problems that led to termination of his parental rights and 
continued to live free of these problems for a minimum of eighteen 
months. 
(b) If the court finds the conditions in division (E)(3)(a) to be met, it then 
shall proceed to a hearing to determine whether a change in custody is in 
the best interest of the child.  In making the determination, the court shall 
consider the following factors: 
(i) No special treatment shall be afforded to the child’s biological parent 
based solely on his status as biological parent of the child; 
(ii) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child's 
parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-home providers, 
and any other person who may significantly affect the child; 
(iii) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child, an attorney 
for the child, or through the child's guardian ad litem, with due regard for 
the maturity of the child; 
(iv) The custodial history of the child, including the length of time that the 
child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children 
                                                           
(2) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through the child's 
guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the child; 
(3) The custodial history of the child, including whether the child has been in the 
temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child 
placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period 
. . .; 
(4) The child's need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether that type of 
placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency; 
(5) Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this section apply in 
relation to the parents and child. 
Id. 
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services agencies or private child placing agencies, the number of foster 
care placements the child has had, and the amount of time spent in each 
placement; 
(v) The child's need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether 
that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent 
custody to the petitioner; 
(vi) Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this section 
apply in relation to the parent and child; and 
(vii) Any other factor the court considers important in determining the 
best interests of the child.229 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 Ohio’s statutory scheme does not adequately protect children from the 
dangers of the foster care system.230  By implementing the recommendations 
contained herein, the Ohio General Assembly could correct this deficiency and allow 
the courts to serve their intended purpose of protecting the best interests of the 
children they serve.231  Allowing a parent who has had her parental rights terminated 
an opportunity to petition for the right to become a part of her child’s life after the 
parent has cleaned up her life and the child has had to suffer through several years in 
a foster care system that has failed him, the legislature would be protecting a fragile 
and vulnerable segment of the children in the foster care system who may be doomed 
to spend its entire childhood in the homes of strangers.  Summarily denying a 
permanent home to a child in foster care solely based upon the identity of the person 
trying to give that child a home goes against the fundamental principles of the legal 
system.  Children like Selina McBride deserve the chance to find out if a parent, like 
Peggy Fugate, who has changed her life and created a happy, loving home might be 
in their best interest.   
                                                                
229The newly created subsection regarding factors relevant to determination of the child’s 
best interests are an adaptation of the best interest factors found in Ohio Revised Code Section 
2151.414(D). 
230See generally supra Parts II & III. 
231See generally supra Part V.     
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